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Europe became for a while the center of the human universe for the simple reason 
that modernity was born here, and that the European fictions were written fiom 
modernity's perspective. Since Europe - modem Europe- has appeared as the outcome of 
world history, Europe was presented as the embodiment of universality. And this was not 
entirely se1f;delusion. Universality, as it is meant here, relates to generality as a 
philosophical 'category' to a notion. The foundational principle of (originally European) 
modernity, namely the sentence that all men are born fiee, is the grounding statement of 
human universality. Many universal concepts were forged fiom the interpretation of 
"humankind," among them cultural or art. 
By now, the whole world became modern. Europe's invention, modernity, has 
actually conquered the world. Decolonization was not the sign of the failure, but of the 
success of the European (ad)venture. Europe had to decolonize, because the colonized-at 
least the buk of the colonized-became modems. The modem social arrangement has no 
serious competitors anymore. I h o w  that my summary statement that the whole world 
became modem by now sounds odd and unconvincing, if one considers the huge, and 
perhaps increasing gap in wealth, health, well being among various people in various 
regions of the world. But this objection refutes only those positions which entertain a 
progressivist view of modernity. If one concedes that modernity, albeit a new kind of 
social arrangement in comparison to all the rest, is neither worse, nor better, just different 
than the premodern arrangements, one will not attribute the huge differences in the 
standard of living, the constant wars, or the upsurge of fundamentalism to the remnants of 
barbarism, or to the conspiracy of the North which withholds cunningly the f i t s  of 
modernization fiom the South, but wiU see in them the characteristic maladies of 
modemitytyitself. Neither are such malaises problems that can be solved once and for all. 
The modem European spirit entertains the illusions that every evil is a problem which can 
be handled technologically, that every malfhction can be eliminated if one provides the 
malfimctioning machine with good spare parts. This does not mean that things cannot be 
improved, or that no misfortunes can be remedied. Only that afterward another will 
occur. Everything else is self-delusion. It is enough to reflect on the 20th century to see 
what I mean. The European progression brought the world Bolshevism and Nazism; both 
were the offsprings of modernity, both were universalistic insofar as they were striving for 
world mastery, and both were the ugliest cases of a fundamentalist identity politics. 
Finally, both were the products of enlightenment and nihilism. From the enlightenment 
they have borrowed their faith in science and technology, the ideology of mastery, the 
arrogance of man's deification (for god is dead) and fiom nihilism a criminal moral 
relativism and the blatant contempt of truth. 
Enlightenment prepared the ground for the modem social arrangement insofar as it 
generalized and legitimized the procedure of the dynamics of modemity. The modem 
world, as Hegel already noticed, is not destroyed by negation, but, to the contrary, thrives 
on it. The old, premodern world, this natural edifice had been deconstructed through this 
dynamics. As we know, deconstruction is not simply destruction, but goes with the 
deciphering of the origin of the edifice it destroys. This shows that the grand narrative 
belonged to the process of the deconstruction of the pre-modern social arrangement itself. 
Yet, siice the deconstruction became accomplished, the grand narrative has done its 
service and so it is gone. 
The dynamics of modemity proceeds like metaphysical philosophy. It juxtaposes 
ought to existence (e.g. 'not that this is true, but something else is.' not that this is just, 
somethmg else would be just or more just'). Cultural discourse is just one manifestation of 
this dynamics, and by far not the only one. It belongs to my understanding of cultural 
discourse (borrowed fiom Kant's description of the 'Streit' among judgments of taste) that 
it is and end in itself. Discussion goes on for discussion's sake. In contrast, the dynamics 
of modernity normally aims at the change of institutions, laws and else, that is, at 
pragmatic results. Several kinds of delegitimahgflegitimahg discourse are conducted by 
the firmly set rules of institutions, and this is especially true about the institution of 
science. True, those rules can also become time to time upset. Still, cultural discourse 
and pragmatic discourse are not isolated fiom one another. Even with no pragmatic aims 
to achieve, cultural discourse influences pragmatic discourse and its eventual outcome. 
The former frequently sets the agenda for the latter. A public 'gets used' to certain 
opinions and becomes open for a change if the participants to the cultural discourse or 
cultural discourse itselfwields authority. Only something that wields authority can 
contribute, even ifunwittingly, to the abuse and destruction of other (ancient) authorities. 
All kinds of critical theories participate in such a discourse. 
As long as one says: 'this is not true, something else is' (for example: religion is a 
lie, science provides the truth) enlightenment is neither nihilistic nor does it threaten with 
self destruction. The dynamics of modernity reaches its limits when no afEhmation follows 
fiom the,negation, more precisely, when negation does not result fiom the acceptance of a 
'rational' position as the normal functioning of modernity requires. This happens when 
cultural discourse accepts presuppositions like there is no justice, no truth, no morality, 
the distinction between beautifid and ugly is meaningless and so on. For at this point the 
dynamics of modernity (this is not good, something else is) can proceed only under the 
condition that it negates the outcome of enlightenment and enlightenment itself ('it is not 
true that nothing is true, because this and this is - absolutely - true,' or: 'unlimited 
discourse is evil, limited discourse is good instead.') Without such a radical turnaround 
cultural discourse, disappears, for there is nothing to discuss anymore. But if there is a 
radical turnaround, cultural discourse will be authoritatively limited, it will not be critical, 
and the enlightenment process must be launched again, as the repetition of the beginning. 
This has happened in totalitarian states, this might also happen in contemporary 
hdamentalist societies and movements. Absolute relativism (ifthis limit can actually be 
reached, what I doubt), ends in social chaos or pushes towards fundamentalism. Yet since 
fUndamentalism has resulted Erom the dynamics of modernity, it is hdamentalism without 
fundament, without tradition. This merry-go-round is a characteristic feature of 
modernity, and appears, although in different versions, amidst all the paradoxes of 
enlightenmentlnihilism. Whether this merry-go-round has a tendency, or whether it is just 
a modem version of the eternal return of the same, I cannot tell. 
I will now briefly discuss the main paradoxes of enlightenment/nihilism in 20th 
century (contemporary) Europe. Everyone is familiar with some of those paradoxes such 
as the paradox of universalitylparticularity, fodcontent, identityldifference. I believe that 
behind all those paradoxes there are the all encompassing ones: the paradox of fieedom 
and that of truth. If I wanted to summarize briefly what enlightenment as nihilism means, I 
would answer that both freedom and truth have assumed a paradoxical character. 
Why am I speaking of paradoxes? Because each concept in a pair of values (e.g. , 
universalitylparticularity or difference) carries in itself, or produces its own opposite, yet 
without the possibility of reconciliation or sublimation, for the opposite, again, canies, and 
brings about, the first, and so on and so forth, in a series of 'bad infinityy as Hegel called it. 
Hegel insisted that bad infinity is the result of the limitedness of our thinking. I don't see 
it in this light. I do not trace the Hegelian dialectics here. 
What I described briefly, namely that European discoursive culture produces 
paradoxes, is the main discovery of reflected postmodern thinking. I would even say, that 
this is the only, or at least the main, novelty in postmodern thinking. Reflected 
postmodem thinking is the consciousness of modernity, or the metathinking of modernity, 
insofar as it reflects upon modemity, critically and ironically. Modem thinking believed in 
progression or in regression, in problem solving and in the sublation of all contradihions. 
Postmodern thinking does not. 
To avoid misunderstanding: the main categories of modemity do not necessarily 
appear as paradoxes in daily thinking and practices. The paradox is, as I already 
mentioned, temporalized. At one point one of the categorylpair (e.g. universalism) seems 
to become the main tendency of the modem world. Then, however, with the same self 
confidence, particularityldifference takes its place. Traditional modern European thinking 
vested its fbith in reconciliation; universal values will be accepted by all, and all the 
differences can peacefdly coexist with each other and share in a (common) universality. 
AU normative theories of modernity (my own theory of justice included) design models for 
the reconciliation between universality and difference. Yet if one takes the position of 
postmodern consciousness, the illusory character of such normative theories immediately 
comes to light. Nonnative theories abolish temporality (temporal sequences) and 
incompatibilities: for example, that universality can give birth to differences - in time - 
which become incompatible with the former. In fact, even if not in a peacefid and ideal 
manner, this movement, the temporalization of paradox, can also prevent the self+- 
destruction of modernity. Instead of running amok in one direction, there can came to a 
circular movement, or to the swing of a pendulum where each of the pair (e.g. / 
universalitylparticularity) carries the day at one moment, whereas the other gathers 
momentum as a reaction to the former. Actually, the emphasis put on difference, which 
prepared the way to ethnic identity politics, gender politics, sexual politics, 
m u l t i c u l ~ s m  and alike, is a reaction to the previous universalistic trend. In theory, one 
can design a model of reconciliation. Normative theories reconcile universality and 
dierence such that they put together their respective "goodies" without the "badies," a 
benevolent selective project histories rarely follow. The opposite, to reconcile only the 
'badies' without 'goodies' would e.g. mean to think world wars together with local 
terrorism. Fortunately, histories are not selective in a malevolent manner either. My 
skeptical remarks, however, are not directed against normative theories. In presenting a 
model of 'reconciliation' they can help to push the pendulum away fiom an extreme 
position (of mere universality and mere difference in the now discussed case) whenever it 
swings into one direction too dangerously. 
To offer another example, let me briefly scrutinize the fodsubstance paradox in 
arts. ' In the times of high modernism, particularly in music, yet also in painting and fiction, 
or in architecture, the desubstantialization of artworks seemed to be unstoppable. 
Formalization, however, can soon reach a stage fiom where one cannot go fimher, for 
there is no f i e r .  Pure serial music, a white circle painted on a white canvass, 
nongrammatical text, minimalist architecture - were such endpoints in one direction Since 
there are artists who desire to practice their creative talents and imagination and are not 
satisfied to compose serial music or plan minimalist buildings ad infinitum, a volte face 
was needed - back to stories, to representational painting, to postmodern quotations in 
architecture, to harmony or even melody in music, and so forth - that is, towards the 
resubstantialization of mere form. One cannot say, please, compose like Beethoven or 
perhaps Mozart, for in their works the tension between substance. and form had been 
sublimated. The tendency can be reversed, but not towards "reconciliation." Normative 
theories of art resembles the normative political or social theories. They are not 
"mistaken," neither are they "old fashioned." Although they have no authority to 
prescribe, and they, in fact, do not describe, they do a great service in casting doubt on the 
too easy conviction that the last way to do things is the only way doing them. It is thus 
that they participate in the cultural discourse and fertilize it. 
Contemporary - postmodem - critical theories are more modest. They do not need 
ontological underpinnings; they escape all systems and isms. They are aware of their 
tentative character, fiagdity and finitude. They simply show the sore spot where the shoe 
presses now. They do not aim at theoretical consistency. After all yesterday the shoe 
pressed the right toe, whereas today it pressed the left toe. When universalism becomes 
oppressive critical theory makes case for the difference. When difference becomes 
oppressive it makes a case for universality. Postmodern critical theory faces the paradoxes 
of modernity without offering sure remedies or total solutions. 
These were only examples. And in philosophy, I know, examples are suspect. It is 
better to turn now to the deepest paradoxes of modernity: the paradox of fieedom and 
that of truth. 
Aristotle remarked that European people are known fiom their devotion to 
fieedorn. He meant political freedom, independence, disgust of tyranny and particularly of 
despotism. But the continuation of the story of European freedom assumed a different 
character. Although the content of the concept of fieedom varies greatly in the 
philosophies of European modernity and not all of those concepts are holistic, modernity 
as such is built on the value of freedom, the value of freedom is its universal guiding 
principle, its arch. And this is exactly the springing point: fieedom is taken in modem 
European culture as if fieedom were an arch. But it is not, for it cannot serve as an arch, 
since fieedom is openness, and every arch is a closure. If one returns to fieedom as to an 
arch, as to the foundation of the modem European self understanding, the foundation will 
show itself as unfounded. It is unfounded in principle. As Kant said, transcendental 
freedom has no transcendentai deduction. Modernity is founded by not being founded. 
The modem story of the development of fieedom, be this development fancied as &ear 
or not, is siiultaneously the story of the subsequent loss of all hdaments apart from 
freedom which is none. It is the story of the conscious and willed abandonment of 
fundaments. 
Many concrete kinds of freedom - be it political liberty or moral autonomy - can be 
reconciled with the acceptance of absolute fundaments. After all, God granted men free 
will. But the modem concept of fieedom, even if not totalizing in each and every case, 
calls for the interpretation of the universal value of fieedom in all possible ways, and 
insofar as it calls for all possible interpretations, it abolishes all fundaments. This is why 
enlightenment in a broad sense is nihilism in my (narrower) understanding. Enlightenment 
means to strive for the llfillment of modem destiny qua freedom, and the fblflhent strips 
modem culture fiom all its foundations and makes it bottomless and also defenseless. 
Finally, everything boils down to one thing: the foundation of modemity (fieedom) is the 
negation of foundation. Moderns need to learn to live without foundation. They live 
without Truth. 
There are many kinds of truths. The dominant concept of truth in modemity is 
summed up in the correspondence theory of truth. The dominant concept of truth is not 
the idea of truth, rather the concept of true knowledge. It offers a tentative criterion to 
establish whether a kind of knowledge is true or Mse. This concept of truth is relatively 
foundational. This sounds odd - how can a principle be relatively foundational? An arch, 
and still not an arch? yet the division of values spheres of modernity, the phenomenon 
described by Max Weber, shows how this is possible. The principle of true knowledge 
founds modem sciences and warrants the progress of science and of technology, insofar it 
goes on, and as long as it does. But foundmg science is not yet founding life, morality, the 
vision of the cosmos, our place in the universe, and the world. Needless to say: the 
foundation of modem science is also rooted in the all-encompassing idea of fieedom, for it 
is the ideal (the universal concept) of freedom that sets the rational pursuit for more and 
more knowledge fiee. The correspondence theory of truth itself is unfounded. And since 
true knowledge that founds science and yet remains unfounded produces the sole 
consensually accepted concept of truth in modernity, science becomes the dominating 
world interpretation of modemity. 
This dominating world view is void of moral, religious, existential content. It 
leaves the existers as existers ((to employ Kierkegaard's language) without offering them a 
crutch to lean upon. The correspondence theory of truth is a formal concept of truth. The 
substance of the concept is fieedom, the bottomless, the non foundational. 
Freedom as foundation is the absence of foundation. But the absence of 
foundation grants also its opposite: for if there is no foundation, one is fiee to embrace 
any foundation. One is free to commit oneselfto an absolute Truth. Modem or 
postmodern reflections do not prevent anyone to embrace God, the absolute Divine truth, 
as they do not prevent people or groups of people fiom embracing any collective creed, 
conviction as an absolute one, and to subscribe to this creed as to their new fundament. 
The latter is the gesture of fundamentalism. Neither a personal commitment to the 
Absolute, nor fhdarnentalism are founded absolutely, for their certainties are chosen - 
they do not need them as conditions of their social and personal survival. Chosen 
certainties are in fact, and in the last instance founded on fieedom, based on the 
bottomless. This is why all modem absolute creeds are as paradoxical as the absence of 
creeds. This was the great discovery of Kierkegaard. 
It is typical to accuse postmodern thinking - both the reflected and the unreflected 
kind - with relativism. 
Critics n o d y  bring an indictment against the unreflected kind. The statement 
accused with relativism sounds that each and.every culture has its own truth. Briefly, 
unreflected postmodem thinking is a p d s a n  of the general (anthropological) concept of 
culture. It participates in the cultural discourse with its own token, and this is its truth: it 
is true that every culture has its own truth. The general concept of culture was born in 
Europe, the statement is universal in its extension and even categorical, and the concept of 
truth implies here the correspondence theory of truth, a modem one. But to accuse the 
unreflected postmodern version of selfcontradiction is irrelevant, at least fiom the 
standpoint of a reflected postmodern theory. For the paradox of modernity is not that 
some claim universal truth whereas others emphasize difference, and promote relativism 
with an equally strong truth claim, but that this state of &s is normal. There is as little 
relativism in modem thinking as there is absolutism. For Freedom as the non-foundational 
absolute hdarnent of modernity begets truths that undercut themselves. This is the 
paradox that made its appearance first in Europe and is about to win over the whole globe. 
My objection against the unreflected postmodern thesis that every culture has its own 
truth is not, that it is paradoxical, but that it is insincere. 
Modem men and women, so it seems to me, need to live together with the 
paradoxes of modernity. I would like to speak here again a few words of Kierkegaard, 
who was the one to recognize that one can live with the paradox in quite different ways, 
albeit in all of them one needs to remain aware of the conditio moderna. Unfortunately, 
there is no time left to speak about him in merit, thus I will present briefly a few thoughts 
of his philosophy. He writes: I do not say that this is the truth, I say, this is mv truth. 'My 
truth' does not mean that I possess it, but that it possesses me. My truth can be absolute. 
I can embrace as absolute truth something that can be only approximately known. I can 
embrace the approximately known as certainty, wholly, by a leap. This final gesture has 
two connotation. First, the truth which I embrace is a commitment, I cannot pay just lip- 
service to it, I am in duty bound - by myseK by my own choice - to live according to it. 
Second, I must remain aware of it that my truth is not "our truth." Because if I transform 
my truth into our truth, I reject the paradox and become a fundamentalist - whether an 
absolutist or a relativist fundamentalism makes no difference. But if1 embrace an 
approximation as my truth. - for truth is subjective, - I am standing in the paradox and 
carry it out. This is no relativism, neither is it fundamentalism or universalism. It means 
something else, namely to take responsibility for my actions and to remain true to myself. 
The existential choice cannot be deconstructed. 
I could also tell a story about modernity which culminates in an ethics of 
personality. This would be a partisan story, one sided and suspect. Yet not entirely 
absurd. In the company of friends who pride with the European legacy I will not tell it. In 
the company of friends who abuse this legacy, I will. 
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